The Root of Heidegger's Concern for the Earth at the Consummation of Metaphysics: The Nietzsche Lectures by Wilkerson, Dale Allen
Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, vol. 1, no. 1, 2005, p. 27-34.
THE ROOT OF HEIDEGGER’S CONCERN FOR THE
EARTH AT THE CONSUMMATION OF
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ABSTRACT:  This  essay  attempts  to  situate  Heidegger’s  critique  of  modernity’s  technological
worldview within the conceptual context and time frame of his Nietzsche lectures of the 1930’s.
Heidegger  discovers  in  Nietzsche’s  thought  the  “consummation  of  metaphysics”  and  in
Nietzsche’s  concept  of  “will  to  power”  an  articulation  of  the  world  dominating  principle
reflecting modernity’s  comportment with beings as mere resources for consumption. Such a
principle  voices the  utter  destruction of  Being and  obliterates  any  possibility  for  the more
considerate disclosure of beings in a non-technological way.
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I  INTRODUCTION: HEIDEGGER’S CONCERN
Heidegger is rightly regarded as one of the first philosophers to show concern for
the earth, by laying bare the projected impact of modernity’s technological dominance
over Being. Heidegger’s essay, “The Question Concerning Technology,” for example,
explicitly lays out such a projection during a period of the reconstruction of Western
Europe in the wake of the Second World War. As in his other work from this period,
Heidegger  promotes  a  bringing  forth  of  beings  through  ‘poetizing,’  a  means  of
disclosure by which human beings participate more fully within the totalizing essence of
Being. Some readers, however, have taken Heidegger’s lament over Western Europe’s
unbridled enthusiasm for modern technology with a good bit of cynicism, seeing this
lament only through the lens of Heidegger’s uncomfortable political situation and his
despair  during  the  post  war  period.1 The  unsympathetic  reading  of  Heidegger’s
concern for the earth and his lament over the explosion of the modern technological
worldview, however, fails to grasp the place of such themes in Heidegger’s thought-
path going back at least as far as his lectures of the 1930’s.2
1 For  example,  Sluga refers  to  the  passivity  and disillusion of  “poetizing,”  while  Margolis finds later
Heidegger at the extreme distance of “Quietism” to the 1930’s stance of “fascism.” Hans Sluga, Heidegger’s
Crisis,  2nd ed.  (Cambridge,  Massachusetts:  Harvard  University  Press,  1995),  237.  Joseph  Margolis,
“Discarding and Recovering Heidegger” in  The Heidegger Case, ed. Tom Rockmore and Joseph Margolis
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 418.
2 For a detailed and nuanced reading of the “Political Aspects of Heidegger’s Early Critique of Modern
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To be sure, Heidegger’s activities during the 1930’s give us real cause for alarm.3 In
what follows, however, I will simply attempt to trace Heidegger’s very real concern for
the earth and his critique of the dominance of modern technology back to his 1930’s
lectures on Friedrich Nietzsche, finding in such lectures an interpretation of Nietzsche
that explicitly anticipates his post-war stance concerning technology, the earth, and the
poetizing essence of Being.4
II  THE LAST METAPHYSICAL THINKER
By Heidegger’s own account, the analysis offered in his 1943 essay, “Nietzsches Wort
“Gott ist tot”” is derived from the series of Nietzsche lectures Heidegger had delivered at
Freiburg during the years 1936 to 1940.5 In these lectures, Heidegger continues the
work begun in the 1931-32 essay, “Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit,” by seeking to elucidate
the meaning of Nietzsche’s overturning of Platonic metaphysics. In doing so, Heidegger
also seeks to affirm Nietzsche’s place in the Western tradition and “within the vast orbit
of  the  ancient  guiding  question  of  philosophy,  ‘What  is  being?’”.6 Towards  that
affirmation, Heidegger embarked on the Summer 1936 lecture with a section entitled,
“Nietzsche  as  Metaphysical  Thinker,”  advancing  there  an  argument  that  will  be
sustained throughout his confrontation with “the last Metaphysician.”7 This argument
holds that the will to power is Nietzsche’s name for the basic character of all beings, a
name that answers philosophy’s  guiding question in a way that is decisive for all  of
Western  metaphysics.  Why  is  Nietzsche’s  place in  the  past,  present  and  future  of
Western metaphysics so decisive? How is this meditation on Nietzsche situated within
the development of Heidegger’s thought concerning the Western world’s technological
domination of the earth? 
In Heidegger’s view, Nietzsche and his work stand out as the “Thinker (and the
Thought) of the Consummation of Metaphysics.”8 It remains for us to determine how
Heidegger thinks of this Vollendung and what it means for his philosophical path. That
Nietzsche’s thought proves to be the “consummation” of metaphysics does not mean
that  this  thought  is  simply  the  latest  in  a  succession  of  metaphysical  arguments
concerning the cosmological nature of the universe and its beings, the human being’s
Technology,”  cf.  Michael  Zimmerman’s  Heidegger’s  Confrontation  with  Modernity,  (Bloomington  and
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990).
3 Richard Wolin, The Heidegger Controversy, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1993).
4 For  a  much  more detailed  treatment of  this theme, with  differing points  of  emphasis,  see  Charles
Bambach’s Heidegger’s Roots: Nietzsche, National Socialism, and the Greeks, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University
Press, 2003).
5 Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1977),
Preface x. This edition of Heidegger’s work will henceforth be referenced as “QTC.”
6 Heidegger,  Nietzsche I, ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991), 4/Heidegger,
Nietzsche, ErsterBand, (Verlag Günter Neske: Pfullingen, 1961), 2. The four edited volumes of Krell’s Nietzsche
will henceforth be referenced as “Ni-iv.” The two-volume Neske edition will henceforth be referenced as
“NI-II.”    
7 Niii: 8/NI: 480.
8 Nii: 3/NI: 473.
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psychological  nature,  nor  the  nature  of  the  divine  world.  What,  then,  does  the
consummation of metaphysics indicate? 
Heidegger  understands  “metaphysics”  as  the  name  for  a  particular  kind  of
relationship between beings and Being, and he observes a consummation in what has
happened to that relationship as it plays itself out in Nietzsche’s  words.9 Modernity
“completes itself” in the consummation of  all  metaphysics,  expressed in Nietzsche’s
“thought-path  leading  to  the  will  to  power,”  an  expression  of  “the  unimpeded
development of all the essential powers of beings.” Moreover, modernity is that age
when the human being has developed its powers for thinking in such a way that beings
are thought now to have taken complete “priority over Being.” It is apparent from
these words that understanding Heidegger’s Auseinandsetzung with Nietzsche is significant
for grasping the development of Heidegger’s greater confrontation with the whole of
Western metaphysics and its consummation in modernity. 
Paying heed to those parts of Heidegger’s analysis in the Nietzsche lectures that
suggest the consummation of metaphysics in a new and decisive principle, one guiding
the relationship of all beings in their “taking priority over Being,” will perhaps shed
light  upon  the  well-spring  of  Heidegger’s  critique  of  the  age  of  machination
(Machenschaft). This principle is decisive because it names that power by which values
are posited, while Heidegger’s meditation on this principle in the 1930’s brings him
closer  to  unveiling  modernity’s  one-dimensional  disclosure  of  beings  through
Machenschaft as  merely  that  which  “stands  in  reserve”  (Gestell)  as  a  resource  for
consumption.  For  this  reason,  I  believe  my analysis is  significant for  situating the
development of Heidegger’s  later thought.  We will  indeed discover that Nietzsche’s
value-positing principle constitutes a metaphysic of sorts, one that is the essence, in
Heidegger’s estimation, of Nietzsche’s worldview and one that is determinative of how
and why even the highest values are “posited.” Unveiling such a principle will disclose
also the one-dimensional nature of the metaphysics of the age. 
As I follow Heidegger through Nietzsche’s thought-path to the will to power I will
examine how, in Heidegger’s view, such a principle expresses on the whole the major
elements  of  Nietzsche’s  thought.  Then, perhaps we  will  be in  a  better  position to
understand how and in what way Heidegger conceives of Nietzsche as the avatar for
the  consummation  of  metaphysics.  We may  then  also  be  in  a  better  position  to
understand how Heidegger’s critique of Nietzsche speaks to the still greater project of
thinking on the meaning of Being at the consummation of metaphysics.
9 “Metaphysics thinks beings as a whole according to their priority over Being. The whole of Western
thinking from the Greeks through Nietzsche  is  metaphysical  thinking.  Each age of  Western history is
grounded  in  its  respective  metaphysics.  Nietzsche  anticipates  the  consummation  of  metaphysics.  His
thought-path to the will to power anticipates the metaphysics that supports the modern age as it completes
itself in its consummation.” Nii: 7/NI: 478-479.
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III  WILL TO POWER AS THE CONSUMMATION OF METAPHYSICS
In Heidegger’s  view, Nietzsche discloses  that  the positing of “value” requires  a
“point-of-view”  conditioned  by  the  “preservation-enhancement”  of  “life.”  This
condition is grounded in “becoming” as Nietzsche understands it in the concept, “will
to power,” which is revealed also as that which ventures forth to create the horizon of
the value-positing point-of-view, in the sense that will to power is the “ground of the
necessity  of  value  positing  and  the  origin  of  the  possibility  of  value  judgment.”10
Heidegger confirms the ad-venture-some character of the will to power with Nietzsche’s
aphorism 14 of Wille zur Macht: “Values and their changes are related to the increase in
power of that which posits them.”11 The self-reflexivity of the meaning and purpose of
value and value-positing with respect to power are not lost on Heidegger. He notes that
in Nietzsche’s analysis of power, “values are the conditions of (value) itself posited by
the will to power. Only where the will to power, as the fundamental characteristic of
everything real, comes to appearance, i.e., becomes true…does it become evident from
whence values  originate  and through what all  assessing of  value is  supported  and
directed.”12 Thus, will to power has emerged not only as a newly posited value, but also
as a value that at the same time evidences the positing of new values as such (from the
perspective of  “life”).  At  the  consummation  of  metaphysics,  under  the  Nietzsche’s
guiding hand, “values, utterly transformed into calculable items, are the only ideals that
still function for Machenschaft.”13
Although “life” and the “sensory world” have emerged at the inversion of Platonic
ideals as the conditions for positing such values, the West has yet to think beyond the
metaphysical disclosure of Being:
If the essence of metaphysics consists in grounding the truth of being as a whole,
then the revaluation  of  all  values,  as  a grounding of  the principle  for  a new
valuation, is itself metaphysics. What Nietzsche perceives and posits as the basic
character of being as a whole is what he calls the “will to power.”14 
Nevertheless,  Nietzsche’s  metaphysics  articulates  a  change  in  the  nature  of  value-
positing:  thus a new principle  is  required for determining the ground of all  future
values. Nietzsche names “will to power” as this new principle. It remains to be seen,
however, what Nietzsche means by this appellation. 
Heidegger usually begins his explication of will to power by deconstructing the all-
too-mundane  interpretation  of  what  the  concept  announces.  He  notes  that  the
mundane  view  conceives  of  “will”  and  “power”  independently.  Then,  this  view
connects these notions to form a principle that grounds all existence in “the striving
(will) to exercise rule and authority (power),” or even “the striving to come into power.”
On this view such striving is a consequence of  a psychological  condition that feels
10 QCT: 74/H: 213.
11 ibid.
12 QCT: 75/H: 213.
13 Niii: 182/NI: 250
14 Niv: 6/NII: 36.
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privation15.  Yet,  we  will  fail  to  grasp  Nietzsche’s  meaning,  Heidegger  argues,  by
attempting to characterize this concept in these shortsighted ways. Heidegger suggests
that we should begin, rather, by considering how will to power is “a fundamental term
in the fully developed philosophy of Nietzsche,” meaning, in Heidegger’s view, how the
concept  functions as  the  primary principle  in  Nietzsche’s  “metaphysics.”  Such  an
elucidation,  it  is  claimed,  will  reveal Nietzsche’s  meaning more  clearly  than even
Nietzsche himself understood it.
In the 1943 essay, Heidegger sets up the affirmative part of his interpretation of will
to power with a passage taken from  Also Sprach Zarathustra,  in which Nietzsche first
names the concept, in the words of the title character: “Where I found the living, there
I found will to power; and even in the will of those who serve I found the will to be
master.”16 Heidegger emphasizes the part of this passage that connects “willing” with
the “will-to-be-master,” and he explains that even the will  of a slave “wills to have
something else under him.” This “will to master” is the primary characteristic of all
willing, and it means, according to Heidegger, that “to will” is not principally a will “to
strive” but rather “to command,” defined as a “conscious disposal over the possibilities
for  effective  action.”17 In  the  SS 1939  lecture,  we  find  that  such  commanding is
essential for “holding to be true” (Für-wahr-halten) and for the preservation (Erhalten) of
what  is.  Commanding  (Befehlen)—along  with  “poetizing”  (Dichten)—is  part  of  the
“groundless grounding of a ground in such a way that it grants itself the law of its own
essence.”18  
But,  an important distinction must be drawn between such “commanding” and
“poetizing.” In his analysis of “commanding”, Heidegger reformulates the structural
configuration  of  “value-positing  metaphysics”  from  the  two-fold  standard  of
“preservation” as a “making secure” and of “enhancement” as a venturing forth in self-
overcoming. The first command in willing is likewise two-fold: it is the disposition to
command and the disposal of that disposition. Heidegger describes here not only “the
what” but also “the way” of commanding, and he informs us that this sort of willing
requires,  most  of  all,  self-mastery.  Obedience  to  oneself  is  most  essential  for
commanding. In it, one posits and holds oneself as what one is; at the same time, one
becomes superior to oneself, and in venturing beyond oneself in this superiority, one
becomes, even further, what one is from out of oneself. 
This  essential  form  of  willing  as  self-commanding,  Heidegger  argues,  is  not
grounded in privation. “What the will wills it already has,” meaning that as the will
wills (ventures) beyond itself (Er übersteigt sich selbst), it wills (affirms) itself as what it is.19
Such an affirmation occurs  through the positing of  values.  And,  this  affirmation is
necessary  for  the  will’s  “preservation,”  while the  venturing  beyond itself  into  new
15 QCT: 76/H: 215.
16 QCT: 77/H: 215-216.
17 QCT: 77/H: 216.
18 Niii: 119/NII: 611.
19 QCT: 77/H: 216.
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possibilities, the positing of new values from out of will to power, “enhances” the will’s
willingness to will. Heidegger describes the nature of such willing as self-commanding in
the early 1940 lecture:
Every being, insofar as it is, and is as it is, is “will to power.” The phrase names
that from which all Wertsetzung proceeds and to which it returns…. (O)nly power
posits values (Werte setzt), validates them, and makes decisions about the possible
justifications  of  a  Wertsetzung….  But  power  is  power  only  as  enhancement  of
power (Machtsteigerung). To the extent that it is truly power, alone determining all
beings, power does not recognize the worth or value of anything outside itself.
That is why will to power as a principle for the new Wertsetzung tolerates no end
outside being as a whole.20  
Will to power is that ground from out of which values are posited; it “tolerates” no
supersensory ground outside of  itself;  it  not only “is” the highest  value,  but it  also
accounts for  the way of the highest  value  as  what is.  Such one-dimensional  value-
positing is ultimately meaningless, however, and it consummates the metaphysics of the
West through an “inflexible” and “superficial” principle of inverted Platonism. “All that
is left is the solitary superficies of a ‘life’ that empowers itself to itself for its own sake.”21
While the essential power of Being, having been cast aside, 
wanders without prospect in the region of ‘perspectives’ and ‘horizons’ that are
bereft  of every clearing…. Then the bestowal of meaning gets underway as a
‘revaluation of all values.’ ‘Meaninglessness’ is the only thing that makes ‘sense.’
Truth is ‘rightness,’ that is to say, supreme will to power. Only an unconditioned
dominion of the earth by human beings will be right for such ‘rightness.’22 
As the philosopher of the “unconditioned dominion of the earth by human beings”
Nietzsche is more properly a remnant of modernity’s Cartesian tendencies than the
true slayer of metaphysics. The Nietzschean Übermensch is the essence of the Cartesian
self,  while  “meaninglessness  … becomes something  we  can  know as  the  essential
consummation of this age only when it is apprehended together with the transformation
of man to subiectum and the determination of beings as the represented and produced
character of the objective.”23 Being is reduced to only what can be manufactured and
explained: this reduction, for Heidegger, is the essence of Machenschaft.24 
Mastery  of  power’s  enhancement  (Machtsteigerung),  the “overpowering of  power”
that “belongs to and springs from power itself” is the essence of life.25 Erhaltung “stands
in the service of  Lebenssteigerung.”26 Heidegger describes, here, the way of power as the
venturing out of that which remains the same—the empowering-overpowering-power.
20 Niv: 7/NII: 37.
21 Niii: 176/NI: 240
22 Niii: 173-174/NI: 238
23 Niii: 179/NI: 244
24 Niii : 180/NI : 245
25 QCT: 78/H: 217.
26 QCT: 73/H: 211.
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Will to power means empowering to the excelling of itself. Such overpowering to
excelling is  at  the same time the fundamental  act of  excelling itself.  For  this
reason, Nietzsche constantly  speaks  of  power  being in itself  “enhancement of
power” (Machtsteigerung): the powering of power is empowering to more power.27
Heidegger has elucidated, thus,  an understanding of  “will  to power” that finds the
primary characteristics of willing in acts of “willing as self-commanding” and those
characteristics of power in acts of “power as self-overpowering.” Such an elucidation
contrasts the usual view of will as “striving for possession,” which is exposed now as
only  an underdeveloped form of  willing.28 But,  even this  metaphysics  of  the  “self-
overpowering power” conceals a life that has become essentially without measure and
therefore  without  meaning:  “the  measureless  has  now  disguised  itself  as  a  self-
overpowering  power”  and  meaninglessness  finds  expression  in  “Machenschaft,”
everywhere and always “cloaking itself in the semblance of a measured ordering and
controlling” that brings forth “beings as the sole hierarchy and causes us to forget
Being.”29
IV  CONCLUSION: HEIDEGGER CONTRA NIETZSCHE
While  side-stepping  altogether  several  very  real  and  complicated  questions
concerning the overall accuracy of Heidegger’s portrait of Nietzsche’s thought and its
significance to the Western philosophical tradition, my work has attempted to show
that Heidegger’s discovery of the consummation of metaphysics in Nietzsche’s “thought
path to the will to power” prepares Heidegger’s later development towards a full-blown
critique of modernity’s one-dimensional disclosure of beings as Gestell. In developing a
“metaphysics  of  value,”  which  has  its  ontological  origin  in  the  “will  to  power,”
Heidegger’s Nietzsche attempts to “overturn” the way metaphysics has lorded over the
physical  world from the “heights of the suprasensory.” He appears to spur such an
uprising by setting forth the value of “life” as will to power. But, Heidegger claims, even
this “overturning” fails to “overcome” metaphysics, since “every overturning of this
kind  remains  only  a  self-deluding  entanglement  in  the  same  that  has  become
unknowable.”30 When the will  to  power is  taken as  the  fundamental  principle  for
positing values, Platonism is inverted, while at the same time brought to completion.
The will, in such a reading, works to preserve, fix, certify, make true, correct, justify,
and, in general, make constantly present in a one-dimensional fashion, a world that is
immediately  at  its  disposal.31 What  is  “possible”  for  being,  in  this  view,  becomes
obliterated  in  the  marking  off  of  what   has  value—while modernity  nihilistically
discloses beings in such a way that the domain of the gods has been forgotten, as we
struggle henceforth to rule and to exploit the domain of the human being. It might also
27 Nii: 152-153/NII: 651.
28 QCT: 73/H: 211.
29 Niii: 181/NI: 250.
30 QCT: 75/H: 214.
31 QCT: 84/H 221.
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be said that the not-present,  in this reading, has been ill-considered as we strive to
identify, collect, dominate and consume the present with a one-dimensional disclosure
of beings as that which is constantly at the disposal of the value-positing agent.
It  is  from  this  vantage  point  that  Heidegger  levels  his  critique  of  Western
metaphysics, within which Nietzsche’s Übermensch emerges as the avatar for that which
is  destined to  take priority  over  Being.  From here,  the  Übermensch  appears as “the
supreme configuration of  purest  will  to power;  that  is  to say,  of  the one and only
value.”32 The “Overman” represents  the consummation of  metaphysics  as a  value-
positing super-agent and as the principle consumer of the world. Acts of value-positing
from  out  of  the  will  to  power  respond,  in  this  view,  to  “the  preservation  and
enhancement  of  trade  interests  and  entertainments”33 and  to  the  narrow task  of
securing through the technological disclosure of beings a space within which to live (Die
Sicherung  des  Lebensraumes).  Only  such  a  disclosure  could  secure  this  kind  of  life-
enhancement (ein Mittel zur Lebenssteigerung).34 When Machenschaft becomes a principle for
life, as so happens in Nietzsche’s consummation of metaphysics, modern life kills “all
that (which) is in itself” and consumes and utterly “does away with Being.”35
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32 Niv: 9/NII: 39.
33 Niii: 91/NII: 579.
34 QCT: 73/H: 211.
35 QCT: 107-108/H: 242-243.
